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Abstract: Effective supplier-buyer relationship management should not be seen only in
terms of cost and financial measures, as outlined by Transaction cost economics, but also
in terms of other (“softer”) relational benefits, like e.g. more comprehensive information
sharing, higher levels of trust, better cooperation and increased relationship flexibility.
This second view is grounded in both Relationship marketing and Resource-advantage
theory. Surprisingly, only a few research papers on supplier-buyer relationships address
both of these perspectives equally, as well as in terms of long-term competitiveness (vis-àvis a traditional short-term performance). The purpose of this paper is to analyze business
relationship determinants of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness, where we study
the impact of (1) relationship-based information exchange, (2) network spillover effects,
(3) transaction-specific investments, (4) trust, (5) cooperation (joint actions) and (6) flexibility on perceived (7) supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness. In this regard the main
research question of our study is: Which relational and transactional dimensions determine supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness, as well as how strongly? To provide the
answer this research question we employ an exploratory-type Partial Least Squares (PLS)
regression in conjunction with a novel perspective of network spillover effects, as a set of
independent variables in our model. The data set consists of a sample of 130 international
suppliers (approx. 30 % response rate) connected to a transnational company (TNC) headquartered in Slovenia, which operates in the steel construction solutions’ industry. Our
results clearly identify a relational and a transactional set of determinants of supplierbuyer relationship competitiveness, with the former having a significantly higher impact
on competitiveness than the latter. With regards to specific dimensions associated with this
relational component network spillover effects, as well as trust turn out to be key determinants of supplier-buyer competitiveness.
Key words: Buyer-supplier relationships, transnational companies, competitiveness, determinants, NIPALS algorithm, PLS regression.
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1. 	INTRODUCTION
Supplier-buyer relationships have today become the “backbones of economic activities in
the modern world” (Nagurney, 2010, p. 200) and a focal point of organizational competitiveness, performance and long-term business success (Veludo, Macbeth & Purchase,
2006). According to Gadde & Håkansson (2001, p. 4) for example, “the competitiveness
and profit-generating capacity of the individual firm is highly dependent on its ability to
handle the supply side”. Similarly, Griffith & Myers (2005, p. 254) position the management of supplier-buyer relationships “as a primary driver of both customer and shareholder value”. This is particularly true due to the increased adoption of “globalization and
outsourcing strategies” (Tang & Musa, 2011, p. 25) leveraged by company specialization
and focus “on their core competencies” in order to withstand today’s competitive market
pressures (Blome & Schoenherr, 2011, p. 43). This has become particularly apparent in
international contexts, dominated by transnational companies (TNCs), as key players in
the organization of exchanges across markets worldwide (Hymer, 1960).
Moreover, the transitivity of company’s competitive advantage (Tang & Musa, 2011) has
not only transformed simple linear supply chains into complex networks of supplierbuyer relationships (Nagurney, 2010), but has also made the management of supplierbuyer relationships “a key component of corporate strategy, competitive advantage and
success” (Blome & Schoenherr, 2011, p. 43). This has in turn lead managers as well as
researchers to address the issue of the relational determinants of competitiveness in supplier-buyer relationships.
However, as Autry & Golicic (2010) have shown, the link between supplier-buyer relationship management and company performance/competitive advantage is by no means a
simple one, let alone a linear one, so they have in turn urged for more research related to
this issue. In this regard, e.g. Nagurney (2006, 2010) has emphasized a need to move beyond the traditionally dyadic relationship perspective towards an upgraded network view
where networks are not simply the sum of dyadic relationships. On the other hand, Autry
& Golicic (2010) have also emphasized a need to study the dynamic nature of the link between supplier-buyer relationship management and company performance/competitive
advantage by addressing the mechanism of so called relationship spirals, where the link
between relationship strength/quality and performance is a feed-forward/feed-back process leading to long-term competitiveness of the relationship. Lastly, Jap (1999, 2001) has
in particular addressed the question of pie-sharing relational mechanisms in competitive
supplier-buyer relationships, and called for a deeper understanding of such mechanisms.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze business relationship determinants of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness, specifically the impact of relationship-based information exchange, network spillover effects, transaction-specific investments, trust,
cooperation (joint actions) and flexibility on perceived supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness. In this regard the main research question of our paper is: Which relational
dimensions and transactional dimensions - as well as how strongly - determine supplierbuyer relationship competitiveness?
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To provide the answer to this research question we employ an exploratory-type Partial
Least Squares (PLS) regression in conjunction with a novel perspective of network spillover effects, as an additional set of determinants of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness. Our research design follows both Nagurney’s call for incorporating a network perspective in the study of supplier-buyer relationships, as well as Jap’s stream of
research on specific relational mechanisms driving competitive advantage in supplierbuyer relationships, particularly in the context of building long-term competitiveness of
such relationships.
2. 	THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Given the exploratory nature of our research this section first provides a brief theoretical background for our research, followed by a description of the conceptual framework
relevant to our research with corresponding research hypotheses.
2.1 Theoretical background
The impact of supplier-buyer relationships on organizations can be analyzed from both
operational and strategic perspectives (Carr & Pearson, 1999; Lambert & Cooper, 2000).
From an operational perspective, for example, Kannan & Tan (2006) mainly emphasize
the impact of good supplier-buyer relationships on quality and service delivery, and/
or costs. From a strategic perspective, they emphasize sustainable continuous improvements, innovation, enhanced competitiveness, and increased market presence (Kannan
& Tan, 2006).
In terms of supplier-buyer performance and/or competitiveness, Lemke, Goffin & Szwejczewski (2003, p. 12) emphasize that suppliers have an important impact on the overall
performance and/or competitiveness of the industrial organizations, not only through
minimizing costs, but also through joint product, service and process development, as
well as continuously improving quality across all business levels (also see Yang et al.
2009). Additionally, Lambert & Cooper (2000) define the value of good supplier-buyer
relationships not only in terms of cost, but also in terms of product and service information which adds value. This is especially important in terms of the so-called knowledgebased perspective of supplier-buyer relationships (see Yang et al., 2009), and is further
related also to the so called relationship marketing paradigm which we described more
systematically in the next section.
2.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses
Autry & Golicic (2010, p. 87) point to three key perspectives which link specific relationship dimensions to performance and/or competitiveness; and are particularly relevant
for our conceptual framework and research approach. The first one is the Relationship

8
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marketing theory which emphasizes the importance of long-term and value-adding relationships. These have a superior impact on performance and/or competitiveness outcomes (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). This should be compared to “weak-lined, short-term
transactions” (Autry & Golicic, 2010, p. 89; cf. Berry & Parasuraman, 1991; Morgan &
Hunt, 1994). Within such a perspective Morgan & Hunt’s (1994) Trust-commitment theory has become the cornerstone of the relationship marketing paradigm. While initially
trust was mainly seen as a mediator to the antecedents and determinants of supplierbuyer relationship performance (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), Hutt & Speh (2004) later placed
more emphasis on the long-term and value-adding nature of such relational exchanges.
In such relationships “trust is central” (Morgan & Hunt, 1994, p. 24) and impacts relationship outcomes by reducing opportunistic behavior and increasing acquiescence
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994), reducing negotiation and monitoring costs (Zaheer, McEvily
& Perrone, 1998), as well as reducing conflict (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998). According to Kingshott “trust signifies the transformation from an unpredictable and indeterminate relationship to one comprising relational stability as it reflects the ability
to forecast the motives and behavior of others” (2006, p. 726). This aspect of trust has
been described as trust based on identifying expectations and is believed to be central
to cooperation (Ekar, 2007). This leads us to a link between trust and competitiveness
via trust’s direct impact on cooperative behavior, especially in industrial supplier-buyer
relationships (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Drawing on the multilevel nature of trust in organizational settings – where Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone (1998)
point to theoretically and empirically different operational modes of interpersonal and
interorganizational trust vis-à-vis relationship outcomes – the following hypothesis was
formed:
Research hypothesis 1: Trust, both at the interorganizational and interpersonal level, has
a positive impact on supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness.
Within the relationship marketing perspective the role of communication, especially information sharing, has also been specifically emphasized (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). On
the one hand, withholding information can be actually understood as a dimension of
passive opportunistic behavior (Jap & Anderson, 2003). We can thus say that there is a
close link between the exchange of information and the lack of opportunistic behavior in
business relationships, particularly supplier-buyer relationships, since “the overall purpose of monitoring is to reduce opportunism by virtue of reducing information asymmetry” (Wathne & Heide, 2000, p. 43). On the other hand, several prominent scholars in
the marketing literature have emphasized the positive link between exchange of information (communication) and trust. Thus, past exchange of information leads to higher
levels of trust between actors (Anderson & Narus, 1990), while a trusting relationship
atmosphere further encourages better, more pristine and open exchanges of information
(Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Anderson & Narus (1990) further pointed to a dynamic circular view between information exchange and trust, which Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist (2007) described as a reciprocal relationship. In terms of relationship outcomes,
Selnes (1998) believes that open and timely communication had a positive influence on
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the level of satisfaction of all actors involved in the relationship, as well as other relationship outcomes.
Research hypothesis 2: Relationship-based information sharing has a positive impact on
supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness.
The second theoretical perspective discussed by Autry & Golicic (2010) is perhaps the
most intuitively linked to competitiveness. This is the so-called Resource-advantage
theory of competition (Hunt & Morgan, 1995, 1996, 1997; Hunt, 2000). More recently,
this theoretical perspective has been directly integrated to the supply chain literature by
Hunt & Davis (2008, 2012), merging the two disciplines together. Hunt and Morgan have
in their rich stream of work addressed the shortcomings of a “static” understanding of
market competition and provided their “dynamic” alternative. Within this perspective
relationships and relationship strength were positioned as a key resource for organizational competitive advantage building (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). More recently, Hunt &
Davis (2008) have explicitly called for the employment of the Resource-advantage theory
in the supply chain management literature. In this regard, Hunt & Davis (2012, p. 16)
have linked this organizational capability perspective specifically to supply chain management through Hunt & Morgan’s (1995) Resource-advantage theory. Building on Hunt
& Davis’ (2008, 2012) work, relationships should not simply be viewed as a crucial organizational resource which contributes to sustainable competitive advantages by facilitating the flexibility of embeddedness and dissembeddedness. This is because, according
to Heidenreich (2012), the TNC’s capability to switch between different types of embeddedness/disembeddedness3 is crucial to its competitive advantage. They should actually
be managed as complex social conduits of (1) activity links/patterns, (2) resource ties/
constellations and (3) actor bonds/webs. Such a complex pattern of interaction – operationalized within the marketing literature by the ARA interaction model (Håkansson &
Snehota, 1995) – requires collaborative behavior which creates long-term, trusting and
value-adding relationships, which can be seen as key intangible organizational resources
(Makovec Brenčič, 2000; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Hunt & Morgan, 1995).
In supplier-buyer contexts collaborative behavior leads to “pie expansion” where mutually beneficial strategic competitive advantages are created between suppliers and buyers
(Jap, 1999, p. 461). This can also be related to trust and is consistent to Anderson & Narus’ (1990, p. 45) description that “once trust is established, firms learn that coordinated,
joint efforts will lead to outcomes that exceed what the firm would achieve if it acted
solely in its own interest”.
Dwyer, Schurr & Oh (1987, p. 13) saw joint actions – in the form of “joint efforts related to
both performance and planning over time” – as a core relational exchange mechanism,
In this context, the concept of embeddedness is employed as an economic sociology concept and relates to
the structural and relational influence of “ongoing systems of social relations” on social and economic actions
(Granovetter, 1985, p. 487; also see Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990, for a typology of different types of embeddedness).

3
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linking suppliers and buyers in successful and long-term relationships. More specifically,
collaborative behavior impacts relationship outcomes by increasing efficiency through
better coordination and planning, and higher flexibility and adjustments which all lead
to a sustainable long-term competitive advantage (Nyaga, Whipple & Lynch, 2010).
Research hypothesis 3: Collaborative behavior in the form of joint planning and joint
problem solving has a positive impact on supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness.
Flexibility is a key performance indicator and outcome of an efficient and competitive
operation system – like e.g. supplier-buyer relationships (Bertrand, 2003). In operational terms flexibility is not only crucial to deal with increasing market and demand uncertainty (Bertrand, 2003), but also to constantly adapt to transient market conditions
(Swafford, Ghosh & Murthy, 2006). This can be related to both Hunt & Morgan’s (1995)
Resource-advantage theory of competition – which emphasizes this transient competition
perspective – as well as Hunt & Davis’ (2012) understanding of flexibility as a key organizational capability in a supply setting. Furthermore, in relational governance terms,
Cannon, Achrol & Gundlach (2000) see flexibility as a particular type of social cooperative norm. Based on a sample of 396 buyer-seller relationships they were able to show that
flexibility, as a particular type of social cooperative norm, positively affects relationship
outcomes in cases of both high and low level of transaction uncertainty (Noordewier,
John & Nevin, 1990). A similar perspective on flexibility, as a relational norm, was outlined by Heide & John (1992).
Research hypothesis 4: Relationship flexibility has a positive impact on supplier-buyer
relationship competitiveness.
The last, third, perspective discussed by Autry & Golicic (2010) is the traditional Transaction cost economics theory which balanced internalization and externalization costs.
In this regard, the most efficient supplier-buyer relationship was the one based on the
lowest possible total cost – where internal operations costs were balanced-off with the
costs of purchasing, planning, adapting and monitoring externally-transacted operations (Williamson, 1996). Addressing the question of interorganizational competitive
advantage, Dyer & Singh (1998, p. 660) saw transaction-specific investments as one of
“the four potential sources of interorganizational competitive advantage”. They linked
the role of transaction-specific investment particularly to the creation of strategic relational rents as sources of sustainable long-term competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh,
1998). Yet, the transaction cost perspective needn’t necessarily be an alternative to the
relationship perspective in studying supplier-buyer relationships, since the ultimate
goal of efficient supplier-buyer relationships is to achieve a socially desirable and economically acceptable performance outcome, which in turn contributes to a sustainable
competitive advantage, Jap (2001) drew on the earlier work of Dyer (1996) and Dyer
& Singh (1998) to show how suppliers and buyers “interrelate the use of idiosyncratic
investments [transaction-specific investments], knowledge-sharing processes [relation-
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ship-based information], complementary capabilities and effective governance to create
competitive advantages” (Jap, 2001, p. 19). This perspective has also been taken up by
Autry & Golicic’s relationship spirals perspective (2010, p. 90), who emphasize that “the
iterative sequencing of the relationship strength and relationship-specific performance
constructs as a spiral is supported via the integration of social capital and transaction
cost economics theories”.
Research hypothesis 5: Transaction-specific investments, both into physical assets and
people, have a positive impact on supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness.
Lastly, our conceptual framework also importantly addresses the issue of network
spillover effects, because dyadic supplier-buyer relationships are not only embedded
and constrained by their wider networks (Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson, 1994; cf.
Granovetter, 1985), but the actors involved also “use their network consciously to support the business done in specific relationships” (Claro & Claro, 2011, p. 514). Within
their respective networks individual actors also develop different network identities.
They in turn relate “to the perceived attractiveness (or repulsiveness) of a firm as an
exchange partner due to its unique set of connected relations with other firms, links
to their activities, and ties with their resources” (Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson,
1994, p. 4). This sort of understanding formed the conceptual basis for our analysis
of the impact of network spillover effects on supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness.
This can be connected to Burt’s (1995) research on network structures and actors’ structural positions, and further connects to the question of motivation of a particular supplier in a supply relationship. This helps to explain signaling effects, where “transaction
with firms of known reputation and capabilities” may be a motivation behind a given
supplier-buyer relationships and its TSIs (Claro & Claro, 2011, p. 515). In their discussion
of the determinants of attraction in supplier-buyer relationships, Hald, Cordón & Vollmann (2009) focused on the issue of perceived expected value of supplier-buyer relationships. This perceived expected value can, among other things, also be association related.
In this regard, a supplier may increase its legitimacy by being associated with a particular
buyer (Hald, Cordón & Vollmann, 2009, p. 963).
Providing a more systematic typology of possible indirect value functions of supplierbuyer relationships, Walter, Ritter & Gemünden (2001, p. 368) outlined three different
indirect functions, which directly correspond to our network spillover effects, namely:
(1) the market function (creating new relationships based on references); (2) the scout
function (obtaining information from other boundary spanning actors on potential new
relationships); and (3) the access function (relationships enabling direct access to other
relationships, resources and/or activities).
Research hypothesis 6: Network spillover effects have a positive and substantial impact on
supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness.
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
Data was collected from a sample of 130 international suppliers to a particular TNC
between June and August 2011 (approx. 30 % response rate; convenience-based-type
sample) using a web-based questionnaire in Slovenian, English, Serbian and Russian
language. The surveyed suppliers were all connected to a particular TNC headquartered
in Slovenia, with manufacturing operations in Slovenia, Serbia, Russia and United Arab
Emirates. The TNC produces metal constructions and components, and is considered a
leading developer of unique and complete solutions related to steel constructions, roof
systems, façades, steel containers, as well as complete sound insulation solutions in Eastern Europe. It also has a strong presence in selected Western European markets and in
Russia. In 2011 the TNC employed over 1,000 people world-wide and generated revenues
in excess of 178 million EUR.
3.2 Methodology
The data set was analyzed using Partial Least Squares (PLS) univariate regression
modeling,4 based upon the specific model of supplier-buyer relationship management developed for the Dutch potted plant industry. This model was first tested as
a covariance-based structural equation model (SEM) by Claro in 2004, and subsequently by Claro & Claro (2010) as a simpler Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model.
Claro’s (2004) original model was chosen due to its unique incorporation of networkembedded downstream and upstream information exchange. Claro named this simply
as “the business network” (ibid. p. 176), which is in accordance with Gulati’s (2007) understanding of networks being important information repositories. The inclusion of this
network-information-based perspective was an important contribution to the analysis of
supplier-buyer relationships, which were (and still are) traditionally analyzed at a dyadic
level. Such information exchange was first modeled as a key exogenous latent construct
within Claro’s (2004) PLS SEM testing, with the final dependent latent construct in the
model being performance. In their extension of this analysis, Claro & Claro (2010) further analyzed this type of information exchange within their OLS regression testing.
Here, supplier-buyer collaboration was chosen as the dependent (compounded) variable
in their modeling.
Our PLS regression model includes seven constructs from the original 2004 Claro model.
It further includes an adjustment of Claro’s (2004) complex five-level5 business network
4

Using the plsreg1 algorithm in R, ver. 2.15.2.

The five levels of upstream and downstream information exchange observed the information exchanged
with (1) first tier suppliers, (2) other suppliers (e.g. second tier), (3) other buyers, (4) buyers’ customers, and (5)
agents of the cooperative network (brokers) (Claro, 2004, pp. 176-177).

5
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construct to the specifics of the star-like, transnational supplier-buyer network research
setting.6 Next, four variables related to network spillover effects, adapted from Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson’s (1994, p. 12) concept of the anticipated constructive effects
of network identity, were also added to our analysis. The inclusion of network spillover
effects further extends Claro’s (2004) business network context for possible sources of
suppliers’ motivation in the relationship with the focal TNC.
Lastly, Claro’s (2004) original performance variables were replaced by variables related to supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness in order to incorporate a more
long-term perspective of supplier-buyer relationships (as opposed to a more short-term
perspective of performance), as well as to address a key managerial challenge faced by
TNCs. Three variables related to various aspects of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness (see Table 1) were transformed into a single compounded variable (using
simple average), based on satisfactory convergent validity (AVE=0.718) and internal
reliability statistics (Cronbach’s alpha=0.804; composite reliability=0.884). This compounded variable was then used as the dependent variable in our PLS regression analysis.
In terms of the methodology employed, PLS regression was used as opposed to traditional OLS regression due to the exploratory nature of our analysis. Our analysis should
be seen as an adjustment and considerable substantive expansion of Claro’s (2004) original model testing. Furthermore, since Claro’s (2004) model was originally conceptualized and tested as a SEM with latent reflective constructs, and given the relatively small
sample compared to the number of analyzed variables (30 items), PLS regression was
employed to tackle multicolinearity issues and correlation spuriousness (Geladi & Kowalski, 1986; Tenenhaus, 1998, Helland, 2001).
3.3 Operationalization (scales employed)
Table 1 provides an overview of the scales employed which are connected to 10 different
constructs included in our analysis based on the adjustment and extension of Claro’s
(2004) covariance-based SEM. Please pay attention to the codes of individual independent variables (e.g. q2a, q6f) which refer to the item within a specific question. The original English version of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1 at the end of the
paper.
As discussed earlier, the three variables related to supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness in Table 1 (q11a-q11c) were transformed into a single compounded variable
(named Comp) and used subsequently as the dependent variable in our PLS regression
analysis.
A star-like network refers to a network with a single central actor (in our case the TNC) and several other
actors which are connected only to this central actor, but not among themselves (in our case to other TNC
suppliers).

6
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Table 1: Operationalization of the determinants of supplier-buyer relationship
competitiveness in a TNC context
Construct

Abbreviation

Competitiveness

Comp
(dependent)

Relationship-based
information

Info
(independent)

Operationalization (variable codes)
3 items related to: (1) SCM as an important source of TNC
competitive advantage(q11a); (2) increased competitiveness
of supplier due to relationship with TNC (q11b); (3) efficient
SCM leading to dyadic supplier-buyer higher competitiveness
(vis-à-vis market competition) (q11c)
5 items of shared information between TNC and supplier
related to: (1) prices (q2a); (2) quantities (q2b); (3) logistic
operations (q2c); (4) production process (q2d); (5) future
actions (q2e)

Reference
Scales developed from
work by Veludo, Macbeth
& Purchase, 2006; Dyer &
Singh, 1998; Harland, 1996
Adapted from Claro,
2004; based on Anderson,
Håkansson & Johanson,
1994; Blakenburg, Eriksson
& Johanson, 1999

4 items related to: (1) transferability of know-how and
expertise to other relationships (q3a);
(2) attractiveness to other partners (q3b);
Adapted from Anderson,
Network spillover
Spill
(3) increased productivity in other relationships
Håkansson & Johanson,
effects
(independent)
due to developed competencies (q3c); (4) increased
1994
competitiveness in other relationships due to developed
competencies (q3d)
3 items: (1) significant supply relationship investments
Transaction-specific
Adapted from Heide &
TSI_ass
(q4a); (2) specific adjustments in organizational processes
investments (TSIs) in
John, 1992; Bensaou &
(independent)
(q4b); (3) significant commitment to specific internal process
physical assets
Venkatraman, 1995
and organization (q4c)
3 items: (1) learning about partner’s business practices
Transaction-specific
Adapted from Heide &
TSI_per
(q4d); (2) additional activities, training and education
investments (TSIs) in
John, 1992; Bensaou &
(independent)
(q4e); (3) losing knowledge about partner’s operation if
people
Venkatraman, 1995
relationship is terminated (q4f)
3 items: (1) TNC unit openness/honesty in negotiations (q5a);
Interorganizational
Trust_org
Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone,
(2) TNC unit trustworthiness (q5b); (3) TNC unit looking out
trust
(independent)
1998
for partner interests (q5c)
3 items: (1) contact person’s openness/honesty in
Trust_per
negotiations (q5d); (2) contact person’s trustworthiness
Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone,
Interpersonal trust
(independent)
(q5e); (3) contact person looking out for partner interests
1998
(q5f)
3 items of joint planning related to: (1) volume demands
Heide & John, 1990 & 1992;
Plan
Joint planning
(q6a), (2) long-term plans for new products (q6b), (3) sales
Heide & Miner, 1992; Lush
(independent)
forecasts (q6c)
& Brown, 1996
3 items of joint problem solving related to: (1) dealing with
Heide & John, 1990 & 1992;
Solve
Joint problem solving
problems jointly (q6d); (2) shared responsibility (q6e); (3)
Heide & Miner, 1992; Lush
(independent)
commitment to improvements (q6f)
& Brown, 1996
3 items: Efficient response in a supply relationship to: (1)
day-to-day (operational) changes (q7a);
Flex
(2) occasional (e.g. quarterly tactical) changes (q7b): (3)
Adapted from Golden &
Flexibility
(independent)
substantive, long-term, and rare (strategic) changes (q7c)
Powel, 2000
(Efficient = with minimal impact /degradation
on performance)
Source: Adapted and extended from Claro, 2004, pp. 74-77; own review of the relevant literature presented in
the last column of the table. Notes: SCM=supply chain management.
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All the variables in Table 1 were measured on 7-point Likert-type scales – where 1 corresponded to the lowest possible value (completely disagree) and 7 to the highest possible
answer value (completely agree).
The next section presents the results. First, the Non-Linear Iterative Partial Least Squares
(NIPALS) algorithm was employed in R with the goal of indentifying an optimal set of
principal components out of the 30 independent variables. Identified principal components are subsequently used in the PLS regression model.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics and principal component analysis
Table 2 presents a summary of selected descriptive statistics. Due to the large amount of
analyzed variables (3 dependent and 30 independent) descriptive statistics are presented
at the conceptualized construct level for each of the 10 constructs outlined in Table 1.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics at conceptualized construct level (7-point Likert-type
scale)
Items
Mean
SD
α
Skewness*
Kurtosis**
(see Table 1) (simple average)
Comp
q11a-q11c
4.40
1.19
0.80
-0.52
-0.14
Info
q2a-q2e
5.08
1.32
0.87
-0.88
-0.04
Spill
q3a-q3d
4.50
1.46
0.93
-0.70
0.29
TSI_ass
q4a-q4c
4.81
1.41
0.77
-0.45
-1.04
TSI_per
q4d-q4f
4.17
1.37
0.75
-0.35
-0.76
Trust_org
q5a-q5c
5.32
1.44
0.90
-1.34
1.48
Trust_per
q5d-q5f
5.42
1.47
0.93
-1.58
2.16
Plan
q6a-q6c
3.91
1.60
0.86
-0.41
-0.91
Solve
q6d-q6f
5.28
1.27
0.83
-1.46
2.42
Flex
q7a-a7c
4.95
1.32
0.95
-0.79
0.72
Source: Suppliers’ survey, 2011 (n=130). Notes: SD=standard deviation. α=Cronbach’s alpha. *Skewness for
normal distribution is 0. **Kurtosis for normal distribution is 3.
Construct

As we can see from the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 interpersonal and interorganizational trust has the highest mean scores, indicating a relatively high degree
of both types of trust among our supplier-buyer relationships. Similarly, joint problem
solving and relationship-based information exchange also display mean scores above
value five on a 7-point Likert-type scale. On the other hand, the mean value of 3.91 for
joint planning indicates, at least relatively speaking, a moderate level of joint planning in
the surveyed supplier-buyer relationships.
As expected, all constructs display appropriate internal reliability statistics (Cronbach’s
alpha over 0.7), given the employment of established and numerously cross-validated
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scales. In terms of the distribution of the aggregate constructs we can see that all constructs are non-normally distributed.
Table 3 provides sample characteristics related to 130 suppliers and their corresponding TNC supplier-buyer relationships. As we can see the average length of the supplier-buyer relationships was 6.2 years. Among the surveyed suppliers almost 80 % are
micro, small and medium-sized suppliers (in terms of the number of employees) with
up to 50 employees. In general, these suppliers are quite independent of the TNC in
terms of income generation, since they generate only up to 5 % of their income from
business with the focal TNC. Almost half of them come from Slovenia; and a fifth from
other EU countries and Switzerland. Two thirds of them supply to a key TNC unit in
Slovenia.
Table 3: Sample characteristics
Characteristic
Supplier-buyer relationship length
Average number of employees
(of supplier)
% of supplier income generated from
the TNC

Country of supplier

Key TNC location being supplied to

Type of supply

Data (sample structure)
Mean=6.22 years (SD=4.83 years)
Median=5 years
22.2 % micro (0-9 employees);
34.9 % small (10-50 employees);
20.6 % medium (51-250 employees);
22.2 % large (251+ employees)
50.8 % (up to 1 % generated income from TNC);
29.2 % (between 1.1 % and 5 % generated income from TNC)
20.0 % (more than 5 % generated income from TNC)
Slovenia (45.3 %);
Other EU countries & Switzerland (22.6 %);
Russia (18.9 %);
Serbia (13.2 %)
Slovenia (66.2 %);
Serbia (16.2 %);
Russia (16.2 %)
Machinery & equipment (25.8 %);
Components for bonding/gluing (19.5 %)
Prepainted steel panels (13.2 %)
Steel/black metallurgy (12.5 %)
Other (29.0 %)

Source: Suppliers’ survey, 2011 (n=130).

Next, Table 4 shows the results of the NIPALS algorithm-based Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) on the original 30 independent variables corresponding to the nine constructs from Table 1.
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Table 4: Results of PCA based on the NIPALS algorithm (30 independent variables,
9 constructs)
Components
Eigen values (> 1.00)
Explained variance
Cumulative explained variance
#1
12.2
40.7 %
40.7 %
#2
4.3
14.2 %
54.9 %
#3
2.4
8.1 %
63.0 %
#4
1.7
5.8 %
68.8 %
#5
1.5
5.0 %
73.8 %
#6
1.2
3.9 %
77.7 %
Source: Suppliers’ survey, 2011 (n=130). Note: Analysis performed using the nipals algorithm in R, ver.
2.15.2.

As we can see from the results in Table 4, NIPALS PCA procedure identified six potential components with Eigen values over 1.0. However, only two components explain more than 10 % of the variance per component. Overwhelmingly, the first component explains 40.7 % of the variance of the original 30 independent variables, while
the second component explains an additional 14.2 % (cumulative explained variance
of 54.9 %). The remaining four components jointly explain only 23 % of additional
variance.
Based on the results of PCA presented in Table 4 and additional analyses7 a two-component solution was chosen as the optimal one, as it explained 54.9 % of the total variance
of the original 30 independent variables. Figure 1 shows the plot diagrams for the selected two-component solution, both for the 30 original independent variables (left hand
side) and the 130 observation (right hand side).
Figure 1: Plot diagrams for the selected two-component solution

Source: Suppliers’ survey, 2011 (n=130). Note: Analysis performed using the nipals algorithm in R, ver. 2.15.2.
Due to resizing of the plot diagram related to observations (right hand side) the depicted number of observations (represented by blue dots) appear smaller than the actual number of observation (n=130).
Additionally, distance-to-the-origin analysis and cosinus analysis were also performed in R. Results can be
obtained from the authors upon request.
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With regards to the left hand side plot diagram in Figure 1, which shows the plotting of
the 30 independent variables, it must be pointed out that variables closer to the circle perimeter are better represented by the two-component solution. Furthermore, the closeness of selected variables indicates the level of correlation. By observing the left hand
side plot diagram we can thus conclude that there appears to be a relatively high degree
of multicolinearity among independent variables analyzed, which again strongly supports the selection of PLS over the OLS-type regression. Having established the optimal
number of principal components with the NIPALS procedure the results of PLS regression are presented in the next section.
4.2 PLS regression results
Based on a two-component solution identified by the NIPALS PCA procedure in the
previous section Table 5 presents the results of our univariate PLS regression model, with
supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness as the dependent variable. Given the large
amount of the analyzed independent variables (30), only the top five most important
independent variables according to their loadings on each of the two components in our
regression model are shown.
Table 5: Top five determinants of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness based on
top five loadings across the two components (univariate PLS regression)
Variable

Construct

Component #1
Loadings
Correlation
(x)
coefficient

Component #2
Loadings Correlation
(x)
coefficient

What we learn from working with this TNC unit will be use full in our
Spill
0.242
0.854
other (non-TNC) future business relationships (q3a)
Competences developed in working with this TNC unit can be used
to enhance the competitiveness in all our other (non-TNC) business
Spill
0.233
0.822
relationships (q3d)
My contact person at this TNC unit is a trustworthy person (q5e)
Trust_per
0.224
0.793
This TNC unit is a trustworthy business partner (q5c)
Trust_org
0.224
0.793
I have faith in my contact person at this TNC unit to look out for our
Trust_per
0.220
0.776
company interests (q5f)
We have made important investments to deliver products to this
TSI_ass
0.442
0.619
TNC unit (q4a)
Supplying to this TNC unit required additional tasks, training and
TSI_per
0.413
0.579
skills for at least some of our employees (q4e)
We have invested time and effort to learn about the business
TSI_per
0.388
0.554
practices of this TNC unit (q4d)
Our production processes have been tailored to meet the
TSI_ass
0.385
0.539
requirements of supplying to this TNC unit (q4b)
We have made important investments to handle internally the
TSI_ass
0.357
0.500
products and services that are ordered by the selected TNC unit (q4c)
R2
0.686
0.093
Source: Suppliers’ survey, 2011 (n=109). Note: As the plsreg1 algorithm does not support the analysis of the observations with missing data values the analyzed data set includes only 109 of the original 130 observations.
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In addition to the loadings of independent variables across each of the two components
Table 5 also provides information on the pair-wise correlation coefficients between each
of the independent variables and the two obtained components. By observing both the
loadings and correlation coefficients we can see that the component #1 is mostly closely
connected to variables related to network spillover effects and trust, while component
#2 is almost exclusively associated with both aspects of transaction-specific investments
(both in physical assets and people).
Lastly, by observing the R 2 values related to each of the two components we can say that
network spillover effects and trust (both interpersonal and interorganizational) are the
strongest single determinants of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness, as marked
by a R 2 value of 0.686. Subsequently, a secondary determinant of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness is connected almost exclusively with transaction-specific investments, as marked by a R 2 value of 0.093.
In conclusion Figure 2 shows the results of our regression analysis in the form of plotted correlation coefficients of the 30 independent variables and the dependent variable of competitiveness (indicated as y in the figure) across the two principal components in our regression
model. As we can observe most of the independent variables display quite strong correlation
coefficients with component #1, with the exception of the independent variables connected
to transaction-specific investments (shown in Figure 2 in upper right corner as [q4a:q4f]),
which have quite a strong positive correlation with component #2. Additionally, independent variables related to relationship-based information exchange display moderately positive
correlation coefficients on component #1, but moderately negative correlation coefficients
on component #2 (see correlation coefficient in Appendix 2 – Table 2 – for details).
Figure 2: Variable-component correlation plot diagram (two-component PLS regression)

Source: Suppliers’ survey, 2011 (n=109).

20

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 15 | No. 1 | 2013

As we can also observe from the position of the dependent compounded variable of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness in the plot diagram it very strongly correlates
(β=0.828) with component #1 (hence its high R 2 value of 0.686), but to a lesser, yet still
significant extent with component #2 (β=0.306).
We have also cross-validated our two-component PLS regression model by applying the
plsreg1$Q2 algorithm in R. This procedure randomly splits the original data set in ten
different sub-groups. Each time, one sub-group is left out of analysis as a reference set,
while the remaining nine sub-groups are used to predict the observations in the excluded sub-group. This procedure is repeated ten times, each time taking one of the ten
sub-groups (a reference sub-group) to be estimated by the remaining nine other subgroups. Following this procedure an appropriate cross-validation statistic was obtained
(LimQ2=0.0975) for both components, thus indicating that our PLS regression model is
reasonably cross-validated.
5. RESULT IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Relational vs. transactional determinants of supplier-buyer relationship
competitiveness
First and foremost, our results provide strong evidence in support of Relationship marketing theory, as well as Social exchange theory. This is particularly shown in the high
explanatory power of component #1 (R 2=0.686), which displays high interorganizational and interpersonal trust variable loadings. However, by measuring the impact of
relational and transactional determinants on long-term competitiveness (not short-term
performance), our results go beyond Autry & Golicic’s (2010, p. 96) reaffirmation of relationship-performance spirals to further support Hunt & Morgan’s (1995) Resource-advantage theory of competition in which strong and high-quality (trusting) relationships
drive competitiveness as key organizational resources. In this regard, we see that Autry
& Golicic’s (2010) relationship-performance spiral perspective fits well within Hunt &
Morgan’s (1995) Resource advantage theory, establishing it as a dynamic one.
This brings us to the second implication of our results, namely the difference between
the impact of relational and transactional determinants on relationship competitiveness.
We believe that the stronger explanatory power of the relational determinants (component #1) does not imply superiority over transactional determinants (component #2)
per se. Rather, we believe our results are consistent with what Autry & Golicic (2010, p.
97) refer to as an accrual (additive) effect of relationship strength/quality on relationship outcomes. It is here that we believe Spiral theory is particularly valuable and has
been also indirectly supported by our results, albeit based on inference from our crosssectional data. Given that most of our surveyed suppliers have well-established and longrun relationships with the focal TNC, as is also indicated by the average length of the
relationship and high levels of trust (again see descriptive statistics in Table 2), relational
determinants play a more important role in driving relationship competitiveness, com-
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pared to transactional determinants. This was expected and is consistent with extant
Relationship marketing theory.
The accruing roles of relational determinants and the diminishing roles of transactional
determinants are perhaps best illustrated by relatively high, yet negative factor loadings related to relationship-based information exchange within component #2 (see Appendix 2).
In case of well-established supplier-buyer relationships strong transactional mechanisms
related to transactional information sharing may be seen as a “redundant governance
mechanism” (Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000, p. 371), and can be interpreted as a
negative signal to other existing and potential partners that the supplier is problematic and
needs extra monitoring. Furthermore, this redundancy should also be linked to the punitive potential of network spillover effects, which we discuss separately in the next section.
5.2 Importance of network spillover effects
Ghoshal & Bartlett (1990, p. 603) have importantly described TNCs as interorganizational differentiated networks. Within these networks, however, there are often extremely powerful network “egos” (e.g. TNCs), with large bargaining power and influence over
other their actors (e.g. suppliers). In this context, Dyer & Hatch (2004, p. 62) emphasize
that a lot of transnational supplier networks have a star-like network structure, where
the suppliers are connected to the TNC, but not among themselves. This asymmetric
power/dependence perspective has important implications for the corresponding supplier-buyer relationships and their management, particularly within the so-called Social
exchange theory perspective (Hald, Cordón & Vollmann, 2009, p. 961) in which trust
and social capital are constructed and drawn upon differently within a network setting,
compared to a dyadic business relationship. In such a setting, the wider network context
may become more important for a given supplier than the focal dyadic supply relationship. Our results support this view, given both the explanatorily power of our component
#1 (R 2=0.686) with regards to supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness, as well as the
high loadings (and correlations) of variables related to network spillover effects on this
component.
Within such star-like, transnational supplier-buyer networks individual suppliers importantly craft different network identities, which are related to a “unique set of connected relations with other firms, links to their activities, and [especially] ties with their
resources” (Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson, 1994, p. 4). These identities are very much
association-related and lead to the attraction between a supplier and its buyer. Hald,
Cordón & Vollmann (2009) saw this attraction as a function of the perceived expected
relationship value, which among other things is also very much linked to the development of specific competencies and signaling effects to other potential partners (Hald,
Cordón & Vollmann, 2009, p. 963).
Our results on the one hand support Dyer & Hatch’s (2004, p. 62) position that competence development can be a substantial network spillover effect in TNC supplier-buyer
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networks. This can consequently lead to long-term competitive advantage, which is according to Møller, Johansen & Boer (2004, p. 369; cf. Hamel, 1991) based on both competence development, as well as learning. With regards to signaling effects on the other
hand, the association of a supplier with a particular TNC may in fact have also many
different types of different signaling effects.
According to Walter, Ritter & Gemünden (2001, p. 368), it can be seen as a quality
seal of approval and lead to the formation of new business relationships (the so-called
market function of signaling). It can also help to reach other partners of the TNC (the
so-called scout function of signaling), and can provide access to a wealth of resources
and capabilities pooled across the wider network (the so-called access function of signaling). In addition, Claro & Claro (2011, p. 515) also emphasize that “the transactions
with firms of known reputation and capabilities imply that social bonds guards against
trouble” (cf. Thorelli, 1986). In this regard, the affiliation of a supplier to a particular
TNC provides valuable information to prospective partners on the potential costs and
management issues they may expect if they engage with that supplier. While our results
do not directly support this perspective, the strong impact of trust on supplier-buyer
relationship competitiveness could indirectly provide some support for Claro & Claro’s
(2011) position.
In terms of possible managerial implications from our results we would like to emphasize
that TNC managers should understand the suppliers’ business network and its structure
in order to assess the potential network spillover effects that might drive suppliers’ behavior. This is particularly relevant if there is a big asymmetry in size, dependence and/
or power in the relationship between the supplier and the TNC. Having said this, TNCs
have to be aware of all the potential non-monetary spillover effects that their relationship
to a given supplier may offer, and which the suppliers can “capitalize” on within their
business networks. Through understanding the suppliers’ business network, TNC managers should not only understand potential network spillover effects, but also measure
them and communicate them in order to manage relationships with existing suppliers
and attract new potential suppliers. This will contribute to both flexibility and learning,
which are according to Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) two from three of the most important
strategic objectives of TNCs.
6. 	CONCLUSION
This paper has built on the Relationship marketing and Resource-advantage theory in
analyzing transnational supplier-buyer relationships. By focusing on the specifics of the
transnational inter-organizational supplier-buyer context, long-term relationship competitiveness was chosen as our dependent variable, as opposed to traditional short-term
performance. By testing the impact of specific relational and transactional determinants
of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness we have found that both types of determinants drive such competitiveness. However, in-line with the well-established nature of
our supplier-buyer relationships, and according to Autry & Golicic’s (2010) relationship-
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performance spiral perspective, relational determinants have been found to be stronger
drivers of supplier-buyer competitiveness, as opposed to transactional determinants.
With regards to the former, network spillover effects have confirmed Nagurney’s (2010)
call for the incorporation of a wider network perspective in the study of dyadic supplierbuyer relationships. In addition to this, both interorganizational and interpersonal trust
may be seen as a central relational determinant of supplier-buyer relationship competitiveness. This is consistent with Relationship marketing theory and Morgan & Hunt’s
(1994) trust-commitment perspective, but also complemented by network spillover effects.
We are fully aware that our research is also subject to some research limitations – ranging from a possible common methods bias from single respondents, to analyzing the
perspective of only the suppliers’ side of the supplier-buyer relationship, and to limitations related to the PLS methodology itself. However, we also believe that we have been
able to test two comprehensive marketing theories (Relationship marketing theory and
Resource-advantage theory) in a specific research context of transnational supplier-buyer
relationships, by applying a non-traditional methodology for the marketing discipline.
In this regard, the essence of a fairly complex SEM was tested with the help of PLS regression analysis to provide sound evidence and corresponding implications for both theory,
as well as managerial practice.
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APPENDIX 1: Original questionnaire (English version)
All questionnaire items were measured as 7-point Likert-type scales, with the following
answer values: 1-lowest possible value (completely disagree), 4-neutral (neither disagree,
nor agree) and 7-highest possible value (completely agree).
1. COMPETITIVENESS (Adapted from Veludo, Macbeth & Purchase, 2006; Dyer &
Singh, 1998; Harland, 1996):
a. The supply chain management system at this TNC unit is an important source of the
TNC’s competitive advantage (code q11a).
b. Since becoming a supplier t this TNC, we have become a more competitive firm
(q11b).
c. Because our supply relationship with this TNC unit is managed efficiently, both our
organization and this TNC unit are more competitive on the market (q11c).
2. RELATIONSHIP-BASED INFORMATION (SHARING) (Adapted from Claro,
2004; based on Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson, 1994; Blakenburg, Eriksson &
Johanson, 1999):
a. We get all the relevant information from this TNC unit and this supports us in defining product and service prices of supplies to this TNC unit (q2a).
b. We get all the relevant information from this TNC unit and this supports us in defining product and service quantities of supplies to this TNC unit (q2b).
c. We get all the relevant information from this TNC unit and this supports us in logistic operations of supplies to this TNC unit (q2c).
d. We get all the relevant information from this TNC unit and this supports us in production processes related to supplies to this TNC unit (q2d).
e. We get all the relevant information from this TNC unit and this supports us in foreseeing future actions of this TNC unit (q2e).
3. NETWORK SPILLOVER EFFECTS (Adapted from Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson, 1994):
a. What we learn from working with this TNC unit will be use full in our other future
business relationships (q3a).
b. By working closely with this TNC unit our company can become more attractive to
other business partners (q3b).
c. Competences developed in working with this TNC unit can be used to enhance the
productivity in all our other business relationships (q3c).
d. Competences developed in working with this TNC unit can be used to enhance the
competitiveness in all our other business relationships (q3d).
4. TRANSACTION-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS (TSI) IN PHYSICAL ASSETS
(Adapted from Heide & John, 1992; Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995):
a. We have made important investments to deliver products to this TNC unit (q4a).
b. Our production processes have been tailored to meet the requirements of supplying
to this TNC unit (q4b).
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c. We have made important investments to handle internally the products and services that are ordered by the selected TNC unit (q4c).
5. TRANSACTION-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS (TSI) IN PEOPLE (Adapted from
Heide & John, 1992; Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995):
a. We have invested time and effort to learn about the business practices of this TNC
unit (q4d).
b. Supplying to this TNC unit required additional tasks, training and skills for at least
some of our employees (q4e).
d. If we stop working with this TNC unit, we would be wasting a lot of knowledge regarding the TNC’s method of operation (q4f).
6. INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRUST (Adapted from Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone,
1998):
a. This TNC unit has always been evenhanded and straightforward in their negotiations with us (q5a).
b. Based on past experience, we can with complete confidence rely on this TNC unit to
keep promises made to us (q5b).
c. This TNC unit is a trustworthy business partner (q5c).
7. INTERPERSONAL TRUST (Adapted from Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998):
a. My contact person at this TNC unit has always been evenhanded and straightforward in negotiating with me (q5d).
b. My contact person at this TNC unit is a trustworthy person (q5e).
c. I have faith in my contact person at this TNC unit to look out for our company interests (q5f).
8. JOINT PLANNING (Adapted from Heide & John, 1990 & 1992; Heide & Miner,
1992; Lush & Brown, 1996):
a. We plan volume demands for the next season together with this TNC unit (q6a)
b. We share our long-term product and service plans with this TNC unit (q6b).
c. This TNC unit provides us with sales forecasts for the products we supply to this unit
(q6c).
9. JOINT PROBLEM SOLVING (Adapted from Heide & John, 1990 & 1992; Heide &
Miner, 1992; Lush & Brown, 1996):
a. We and this TNC unit deal with problems that arise in the course of the relationship
together (q6d).
b. In most aspects of the relationship with this TNC unit, the responsibility for getting
things done is shared (q6e).
c, We and this TNC unit are committed to improvements that may benefit the relationship as a whole (q6f).
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10. RELATIONSHIP FLEXIBILITY (Adapted from Golden & Powel, 2000):
a. How well does your supply relationship with this TNC unit respond to day-to-day
operational changes (with minimal impact on performance) (q7a)?
b. How well does your supply relationship with this TNC unit respond to occasional (i.e.
monthly, quarterly) tactical changes (with minimal impact on performance) (q7b)?
c. How well does your supply relationship to this TNC unit respond to one-way, longterm strategic changes (with minimal impact on performance) (q7c)?
APPENDIX 2: NIPALS and PLS regression results
Table 1: Loadings for each of the 30 independent variables on each of the two components
from NIPALS procedure

Source: Suppliers’ survey, 2011 (n=109). Note: Based on the plsreg1 algorithm in R, ver. 2.15.2.
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Table 2: Correlation coefficients for each of the 30 independent variables and the
dependent compounded variable across each of the two components from PLS regression

Source: Suppliers’ survey, 2011 (n=109). Note: Based on the plsreg1 algorithm in R, ver. 2.15.2.

